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A Suggested Approach to the First
Amendment Issues Involved in
Broadcast Regulation
by JONATHAN D. BLAKE*
DEBORA L. OSGOOD** ***

Attempting to say something new about the basis of broadcast regulation is both presumptuous and treacherous. It is
presumptuous because so much has already been written
about the issue over the past sixty years. It is treacherous because the political/regulatory debate has become heatedly polarized, with the Fairness Doctrine as the litmus test between
the print model, "look, Ma, no hands" theory of broadcast regulation and the public ownership/public trustee model.' The
vehemence of these divisions suggests the need to attempt an
alternative, middle-ground analysis.
This Article argues that the historical role of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) in allocating the broadcast spectrum provides an appropriate and constitutionally defensible starting point for developing an alternative theory for
broadcast regulation. In developing this spectrum allocation
theory, this Article first provides an overview of the origins of
spectrum regulation and the constitutional basis for broadcast
regulation. The Article next critically examines the traditional rationales offered to justify broadcast regulation and de* B.A. 1960, Yale College, M.A. 1962, Oxford University, J.D. 1964, Yale Law
School, partner with Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.
** B.A. 1983, Brown University, J.D. 1987, University of Michigan Law School,
associate with Covington & Burling.
*** Although the authors represent a number of broadcast, cable, and other media clients before the Federal Communications Commission, the views expressed
herein are solely their own.
1. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down a Florida statute granting political candidates the right to reply to criticism
in newspapers) with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the imposition of the Fairness Doctrine on broadcasters). Under the public ownership/public trustee theory, the broadcaster holds its license as "a proxy or
fiduciary" for the general public. See generally Red Lion BroadcastingCo., 395 U.S.
at 389. See also infra notes 10, 11, 38 and accompanying text and Section III.
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scribes how several contemporary broadcast regulation issues
could be analyzed under a spectrum allocation theory. It also
examines the implications of the marketplace-based allocations theory of broadcast regulation. Finally, the Article concludes that a theory of broadcast regulation based on the
FCC's spectrum allocation responsibilities offers a sound and
helpful resolution of the tensions between the public trustee
and the pure print models of broadcast regulation.

I

The Origins of Spectrum Regulation
Broadcast regulation originally emerged as part of a larger
undertaking, the authorization of the electromagnetic spectrum for various purposes. At that time, it was thought that
the government (first the Commerce Department, then the
Federal Radio Commission, and, for the past fifty-five years,
the FCC, and, for government spectrum usage, the Commerce
Department again) should decide how much spectrum should
be set aside for each type of use. These decisions depended on
how each use employed the spectrum, how much interference
each use might cause or could tolerate, and other technical issues. Although these were engineering issues, the FCC inevitably had to resolve them by reference to public policy.
For example, if the government had decided to impose
lower power and height limitations on television stations or to
permit greater interference by decreasing the distance between stations, it might have had to set aside more spectrum
for television in order to achieve its coverage objectives. To
use a possible future example, if local television stations need
9 or 12 MHz of spectrum to implement the technically more
advanced high definition television (HDTV) (as opposed to
their present channel width of 6 MHz) and the government
believes that local-station HDTV would serve public interest
objectives, then that combination of technological/policy conclusions will affect how much spectrum the FCC will set aside
for television as opposed to how much spectrum it will set
aside for other services, such as the radio service used by delivery trucks and taxicabs.
As early as 1924, Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover
warned that, without regulation, stations would cause interference to each other and, much to the public's detriment, cancel
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out each other's attempted communications. 2 Years later, Justice Felix Frankfurter echoed this sentiment by describing the
FCC's traditional regulatory mandate as being, in part, "a kind
of traffic officer" of the airwaves.3 Without rules as to driving
on a particular side of the road, rights of way, and traffic signals, the roads would be chaos. Without comparable regulations, use of the airwaves would become a modern-day Tower
of Babel.
The government's function, however, was not simply to divide the pie among competing users, but to enlarge the pie (or,
at the very least, to prevent its shrinking to nothing) by setting appropriate interference and other technical standards.
These standards increase the efficiency and compatibility of
the spectrum's overall utilization.4 Justice Frankfurter recognized this interrelationship among the various uses of the
spectrum, technical regulation, and public policy when he
pointed out that the FCC's tasks included regulation of the
"composition" of the traffic as well as its "rules-of-the-road"
technical responsibilities.5
To enforce its allocation/management-of-interference decisions, the FCC must be able to prevent licensees from obtaining spectrum for one use and then turning around and
using it for a different purpose. The key case in this regard,
LaFayette Radio Electronics Corp. v. United States, concerned
an FCC prohibition against Citizens Band licensees using their
assigned frequencies to engage in radio communications as a
2. See, e.g., Third National Radio Conference, Recommendations for Regulation

of Radio 1-2 (Washington, D.C., Oct. 6-10, 1924) and Fourth National Radio Conference, Proceedings and Recommendations for Regulation of Radio 6 (Washington,
D.C., Nov. 9-11, 1925), cited in W. EMERY, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT 28
(1971).
3. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943).
4. The critical technical fact is that, under the technology available over the
past sixty years, radio signals cause interference for much greater distances than
they provide service. The effect of this co-channel interference is to destroy both
affected services, not to substitute one for another. Government has to take these
technical limitations into account in allocating spectrum and regulating its use. The
government also has to consider that certain uses require a higher degree of security
against interference than others, such as emergency uses by police officers. Additionally, point-to-point users are easier to coordinate, and thus to pack into a particular
spectrum bloc, than are point-to-multipoint users, such as broadcasters. Moreover,
allocation policies that require more complex (i.e., expensive) receivers to protect
against interference may be appropriate for services with relatively few receiving
units such as those used by delivery companies, but they may not be feasible for
high-volume receiver services like broadcast radio and television.
5. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 216-17.
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"hobby or diversion," for Which Amateur Band spectrum is
available.6 A Citizens Band licensee challenged the constitutionality of this prohibition on the grounds that it violated the
first amendment and section 326 of the Communications Act
of 1934.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit rejected this challenge, finding that the FCC was "empowered in the public interest to prohibit communications
over the limited available frequencies. '

II

The Basis for Broadcast Regulation
Other than the challenge of the FCC's restriction on the use
of the Citizens Band frequencies, there has been little criticism on first amendment grounds of the FCC's spectrum allocations role. As discussed further herein, in the past decade
the FCC and others have proffered alternative approaches for
allocating the spectrum among potential uses. However, even
adherents of those theories have not argued that the FCC's
traditional spectrum allocation function is unconstitutional.
It is a principal thesis of this Article that the FCC's spectrum allocation responsibilities provide an appropriate and
constitutionally defensible starting point for developing a theory for broadcast regulation. The resulting theory justifies
only those broadcast regulations that are narrowly tailored to
promote the FCC's legitimate and important spectrum allocation objectives, specifically the policies of efficiently managing
the spectrum and providing a broadcast service that is local in
character and universal in availability.9 This regulatory approach is less pervasive and intrusive than the public trustee
model as expansively interpreted by the FCC's policies of the
late 1960s and early 1970s, under which broadcasters faced ex6. 345 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1965). Accord California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United
States, 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967).
7. Section 326 states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of
free speech by means of radio communication.
47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982).
8. LaFayette Radio, 345 F.2d at 281.
9. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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tensive content and non-content regulation. 10 At the same
time, this approach is not as minimalistic as the pure print
model favored by some government officials in the 1980s,
under which all regulation, however remotely related to content, is disfavored."
Before examining how the suggested spectrum allocation
theory could resolve some of today's broadcast regulatory controversies, the first amendment tensions that limit broadcast
regulation must first be considered. In United States v.
O'Brien, the Supreme Court stated that government regulations will be subject to different levels of scrutiny depending
upon whether the governmental interest is related to the suppression of free expression.'2 Government regulations thatare
not related to the suppression of free expression, i.e., contentneutral regulations, are eligible for lower scrutiny and will be
upheld if (i) the particular regulation at issue "furthers an important or substantial governmental interest" and (ii) "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.' 1 3 In contrast, those regulations aimed at a speaker's expression, i.e., content-based regulations, receive a higher level
of scrutiny requiring a "compelling" governmental interest. 4
Under our spectrum allocation theory of broadcast regula10. Examples included the FCC's ascertainment requirements, quantitative programming and commercialization standards, and program logging requirements. See
respectively Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971) (Report and Order), recon granted in part, 33 F.C.C.2d
394 (1972), Renewal Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems, 57 F.C.C.2d
418 (1976) (First Report and Order), recon. granted in part, 61 F.C.C.2d 1 (1976)
(requiring broadcasters to follow certain procedures to ascertain community needs
and interests and to provide programming responsive to those needs and interests);
Amendments to Delegation of Authority, 43 F.C.C.2d 638, 640 (1973) (Order) (adopting 16 minute commercial guideline and quantitative standards for nonentertainment programming); Television Program Logging Rules, 5 F.C.C.2d 185
(1966) (Report and Order) (requiring broadcasters to maintain a contemporaneous
listing of all programs broadcast).
11. See, e.g., Deregulation of Commercial Television, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984) (Report and Order), recon. denied, 104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986) (eliminating the FCC's ascertainment and program log requirements, quantitative programming guidelines,
commercial time limits, and commercial restrictions against program-length commercials); see also infra text accompanying notes 52-53.
12. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
13. Id.
14. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-2, 12-3 at 789804 (1988); Stone, Restrictionsof Speech Because of Its Content: The PeculiarCase of
Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 81-82 (1978).
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tion, it seems clear that provisions aimed at regulating interference among stations, such as height, power, and separation
restrictions, are not directly related to the suppression of
speech and thus qualify for lower scrutiny. These incidental
restrictions on speech pass lower scrutiny because they are
sufficiently tailored to the government's legitimate and important allocation objectives.
The harder cases arise, however, in the area of the FCC's
second function: determining the composition of the airwaves
and choosing among the different uses of the spectrum. Regulations that limit the uses a licensee may make of the spectrum appear closer to traditional content-based regulations
than technical engineering regulations and, thus, are more
troublesome from a first amendment perspective.
As noted above, the FCC's authority to limit uses has already been challenged on first amendment grounds in LaFayette Radio. There, the Second Circuit upheld the FCC's power
to proscribe certain uses of the spectrum. 15 We submit that
the outcome of that case was correct because, as suggested in
National Broadcasting Co.,16 the FCC's ability to determine
the composition of the airwaves and to enforce those decisions
is an integral part of its broader responsibility to manage the
spectrum efficiently. As such, regulations that limit or govern
the uses of the spectrum should pass constitutional scrutinyeven if they merit higher scrutiny-provided they are narrowly tailored to the FCC's allocation objectives.
Under this analysis, the FCC may properly issue appropriately tailored regulations designed to ensure that the spectrum
allocated and licensed for broadcasting is used only for broadcasting purposes. In this regard, Congress and the FCC have
defined the purposes of broadcast allocations as the provision
of universal 7 and local broadcast service. Accordingly, properly limited regulations designed to promote these purposes
should be constitutional. 8
Congress took the seminal step in identifying the objectives
15. Lafayette Radio, 345 F.2d at 281.
16. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
17. An integral factor in broadcasting's "universality" is the fact that it is free.
18. Conversely, the FCC and the courts have also suggested that using the
broadcast spectrum for purely private purposes is improper. See infra notes 35-37
and accompanying text.
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of broadcast spectrum use when it adopted section 307(b) of
the Communications Act of 1934, which provides:
In considering applications for licenses, and modifications and
renewals thereof, when and insofar as there is demand for the
same, the Commission shall make such distribution of
licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and of power among
the several States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each of

the same.' 9
This provision calls for a balancing between the need for local
outlets and the need for coverage that provides universal service. "Localism" is the label most often given to this concept,
though the label does not do justice to the universal service
component of the policy goal embodied in section 307(b).2 °
The twin goals of universal and local service, combined with
a recognition of the technical characteristics of television coverage and interference, led to the closely meshed, highly articulated set of allocation/allotment/technical regulations that
have undergirded the nation's local television service for forty
years.' The FCC originally considered, but later rejected,
other options such as a few superstations serving all of the
country or very large portions of it (rejected because this plan
entailed too little diversity and local service) or numerous
stations with very small service areas (rejected as inefficient
because of widespread interference and, consequently, inadequate universal service).22
Two major challenges emerged to the service objectives
guiding these television allocation/interference policies.23 The
19. 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1982) (emphasis added). See also 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(f)-(g)
(1982) (requiring the FCC to "[m]ake such regulations not inconsistent with law as it
may deem necessary to prevent interference between stations" and to "[s]tudy new
uses for radio... and generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio
in the public interest").
20. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). In Southwestern Cable Co., the Court explained:
[T]he Commission had concluded, and Congress had agreed, that these obligations [of sections 307(b), 303(f), and 303(h)] require for their satisfaction
the creation of a system of local broadcasting stations, such that "all communities of appreciable size [will] have at least one television station as an
outlet for local self-expression."
Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
21. The most recent version of the FCC's rules relating to television broadcasting appear at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73 (1988).
22. See Television Assignments, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952) (Sixth Report and Order).
23. Major challenges were also launched frontally on these policy objectives, including proposals for short-spaced drop-ins (the addition of new channels to the TV
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first was the growing power of the networks. The FCC decided to regulate the networks in a variety of ways to prevent
them from exercising their power in ways that would threaten
the service objectives of localism. 24 Whether all the network
regulations (or the cable regulations described below) were
wise, or are still wise, is beside the point. It is also outside the
scope of this Article to examine whether all the network regulations are sufficiently narrowly drawn to satisfy the O'Brien
requirements. Network regulations survived first amendment
attack because they were designed to serve the policy objectives embodied in the FCC's spectrum allocation decisions. 25
The second challenge was cable television. The FCC's cable
non-duplication and now defunct anti-leapfrogging rules 26
were both designed to preserve the vitality of the kind of local
television service that the FCC's television allocation and allotment policies sought to promote. The cable must-carry
rules were based on the same rationale. It may be no coincidence that when the FCC abandoned that rationale for the
2
must-carry rules, the rules were found unconstitutional. 7

III
Other Regulatory Theories
A brief look at several other regulatory theories may help
further define the theory presented here of broadcast regulation based on allocation objectives.
Table of Assignments even though they do not meet existing mileage separation requirements) and deintermixture (the shifting of all television service in a community to either all UHF or all VHF channels). See, e.g., VHF TV Top 100 Markets, 81
F.C.C.2d 233 (1980) (Report and Order); Table of TV Channel Allotments, 83
F.C.C.2d 51 (1980) (Notice of Proposed Rule Making) (drop-in decisions) and Second
Report on Deintermixture, 133 1571 (1956); Television Assignments-Fresno, Cal., 41
F.C.C.803 (1960)(deintermixture decisions). Mechanisms for promoting these objectives were also adopted, for the most part, by the All-Channel Receiver Act. 47
U.S.C. § 303(s) (1982).
24. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Mt.
Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971).
25. See id.
26. The FCC's network non-duplication rules provide television stations with
certain exclusive rights to network programming. Cable Television Service, 47
C.F.R. §§ 76.92-97 (1988). The FCC's anti-leapfrogging rules restricted the television
stations that a cable system could select as "distant" signals. These rules were eliminated in 1976. Selection of Television Signals for Cable Television Carriage, 57
F.C.C.2d 625 (1976) (Report and Order).
27. See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied sub nom. 108 S. Ct. 2014-15 (1988).
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The scarcity theory of broadcast regulation has probably received the most attention, pro and con. It is perhaps a first
cousin of the theory presented here, although the rationale of
the scarcity theory is quite different. Its conventional formulation is that the scarcity of the spectrum requires that the
government grant only a limited number of licenses. In turn,
this scarcity justifies wide-ranging and extensive regulation of
broadcast licensees, even regulations that attach conditions to
broadcast licenses to assure access for speakers and viewpoints
that the broadcaster might not otherwise present to its viewers. 28 After all, "the government could surely have decreed
that each frequency should be shared among all or some of
those who wish to use it. ' '2 9 Critics of the scarcity theory respond that fewer newspapers exist today than television or radio stations and that the number of television and radio
outlets continues to grow rapidly, but that no one claims that
it would be constitutional to impose a fairness doctrine on
newspapers.3"
Our spectrum allocation theory, like the scarcity theory,
starts with the fact that the spectrum is finite and must be
used for various purposes. Our theory then argues that society
gets more benefit from the spectrum when the government allocates it among various uses pursuant to regulations that consider various technical and interference factors. Broadcast
spectrum was allocated for the purpose of providing both universal and local service. This system works, however, only if
the government enforces use restrictions. Accordingly, regulations necessary and appropriate (i.e., narrowly drawn) to effectuate these purposes are defensible under first amendment
analysis. If broadcast regulations go beyond these purposes,
they are constitutionally improper.

Thus, although the spectrum allocation theory begins at the
same point as the scarcity rationale, it reins in the expansive
28. See generally National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
29. Red Lion BroadcastingCo., 395 U.S. at 390-91.
30. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE & TRANSPORTATION, 98TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA: THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT

PARITY 50, 59-67 (Comm. Print 1983) (prepared by the Nat'l Telecommunications
and Information Agency) [hereinafter PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA] (comparing
then-current figures of 9150 radio stations and 1050 television stations with 1800
daily newspapers). Today's broadcast figures are even higher. As of June 30, 1989,
there were 10,565 radio stations and 1414 television stations in the United States.
FCC NEWS RELEASE, MIMEO No. 3526 (July 7, 1989).
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reach of that rationale, which is clearly suspect under
O'Brien.3 1 Under the spectrum allocation theory, the scarcity
of the airwaves does not justify any and all broadcast regulation; rather, the finitude of the spectrum justifies only those
narrowly-tailored regulations that promote the FCC's allocation/interference policies.3 2
Another theory justifies broadcast regulation on the basis of
broadcasting's important and pervasive impact on our society.
This theory is not a convincing ground for applying different
first amendment standards to broadcasting than those applied
to other communications media. When the first amendment
was adopted, there were only a handful of daily newspapers
being published in the United States. 33 Their power outstripped the influence any network wields today; yet they were not
given weaker first amendment protection than other speakers.
Finally, the public airwaves theory argues that because the
airwaves belong to the public, the government may condition
broadcast licenses with regulatory impediments that otherwise
would violate the first amendment. This theory does not
stand up, however, because the streets and parks also belong
to the public, but the Supreme Court has heightened, not lowered, the first amendment protection accorded to speakers in
those places.3 4
Nevertheless, the public airwaves theory has carried a
strong appeal historically. Court decisions of the 1930s often
referred to this theory in upholding Federal Radio Commis31. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
As one commentator long ago argued, "the mere fact that there are barriers to
entry into the communications media... does not in itself resolve the problem of
the kinds of control that are permissible and how narrow the focus on restraint of
free speech may be." Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations
on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 88 (1967).
32. LaFayette Radio illustrates this distinction in a non-broadcast setting. The
court of appeals in LaFayetteRadio held that the FCC could lawfully restrict the use
of the "limited available frequencies" because "here [was] truly a situation where if
everybody could say anything, many could say nothing." 345 F.2d at 281. Accordingly, the Citizens Band regulation at issue in LaFayette Radio passed constitutional
scrutiny because it promoted the FCC's allocation objectives of providing separate
frequencies for Citizens' uses and for Amateur's uses and was sufficiently tailored to
those objectives.
33. PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA, supra note 30, at 58-59.
34. See generally Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). See also Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties
of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions
upon a benefit or privilege.").
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sion decisions denying licenses to broadcasters who used their
frequencies primarily to peddle their own brand of tonic, religion, or political belief.35 In those cases, the courts held that
the frequencies were being improperly used for the licensees'
private goals-commercial or ideological-and not for the public good. 6
What the courts and the Commission were driving at, or
should have been driving at, is that the allocation purpose for
the broadcast spectrum was to be responsive to community interests and that.broadcast operations directed solely by private
motivation unacceptably diverged from this allocation purpose,
just as the Citizens Band licensee's use of its assigned frequency for hobby purposes diverged from the allocation purpose of that frequency. 7 Stated otherwise, these cases stood
for the proposition that use of radio frequencies for such exclusively self-interested purposes was not broadcasting, i.e.,
not intended to serve the general public, and therefore not a
proper use of broadcast frequencies. Thus, the spectrum allocation theory would hold that these decisions were constitutionally permissible because they were based on proper
allocation objectives.

IV

Regulatory Issues
The following is a brief description of how some of the more
35. See, e.g., KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C.
Cir. 1931) (denying renewal of radio license to doctor using station to broadcast program known as the "medical question box," during which the doctor recommended
his own prescriptions); Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 62

F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (denying renewal of radio license to minister who used
station to broadcast sensational and defamatory statements), cert. denied, 288 U.S.
599 (1933).
36. See KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n, 47 F.2d at 672; Trinity Methodist Church,
South, 62 F.2d at 852-53. See also Chicago Fed'n of Labor v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 3
F.R.C. 36 (1929) (denying request by labor organization for increase in power and
hours of operation to reach its intended labor audience), aff'd, 41 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir.
1930).
37. This reasoning finds more modern expression in the line of cases requiring
licensees to disclose a financial self-interest in a controversial issue that they cover
in their broadcasts. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 713 (1968) (involving Chet Huntley commentaries attacking federal meat inspection requirements,
while Huntley held extensive interests in cattle ranch operations); Gross Telecasting, Inc., 14 F.C.C.2d 239 (1968) (rebuking the licensee for broadcasting editorials
critical of the airport authority's handling of a controversy involving an airport restaurant that failed to disclose that the licensee owned and operated the restaurant).
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controversial broadcast regulatory issues might be analyzed
under the limited spectrum allocation theory of regulation
sketched above. We do not insist that the following observations are correct. The discussion is intended only to illustrate
how content-related issues might be evaluated under a theory
of regulation based solely on spectrum allocation objectives.
A. Fairness Doctrine
The most famous of these issues is, of course, the Fairness
Doctrine, which had two prongs: (1) radio and television stations had to present information on controversial issues of
public importance to the communities they served; and (2)
once they presented one side of such an issue, stations had to
afford time for contrasting viewpoints.3"
Supporters of the Fairness Doctrine cite all three justifications noted above: scarcity, the importance of broadcasting,
and public ownership. Critics of the Doctrine complain with
considerable justification that it violated the first amendment
because (1) it required broadcasters to carry speech they
would not otherwise carry; and (2) it deterred them from carrying speech they would otherwise carry.
Under our spectrum allocation theory, the question should
instead be whether the Fairness Doctrine acceptably balances
the legitimate spectrum allocation objective of providing locally responsive programming with the first amendment concern about government intrusion into program content. Such
a theory of regulation might conclude that the first prong of
the Fairness Doctrine constituted a proper and not overly extensive application of section 307(b)'s allocation policies because it simply required stations to cover issues of local
importance. Arguably, a station that provides little or no
broadcast material on issues of public importance to its community is departing from the purpose for which it was granted
a license. 39 This would be similar to the Citizens Band licensee that engages in prohibited "hobby" communications.
38. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. 5043 n.2 (1987) (Memorandum Opinion
and Order), aff'd sub nom., 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
39. See Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir.
1983)
(upholding the FCC's switch to postcard renewal applications on the basis
that even
with these shorter forms the FCC would still have enough programming
and other
information available to make the determination that renewal of a station's
license
served the public interest), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984).
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Under this view, an FCC requirement that a broadcast licensee present material on local issues is no more constitutionally
suspect than the Citizens Band restriction upheld in LaFayette
Radio.40

In contrast, the second prong of the Fairness Doctrine may
not withstand first amendment scrutiny. This prong went beyond simply requiring that a station present issues of public
importance to its community in that it prescribed the viewpoints to be presented. Once the station broadcasts a program
on a controversial issue, airtime also had to be made available
for opposing viewpoints, subject to time-of-day and frequency
requirements. As such, it may be said that, under O'Brien, the
second prong extended too far beyond localism goals and that
it was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve those goals.
These seem to be reasonable legal conclusions, if one accepts
our premises. The public policy outcome also seems reasonable, though that is not the thrust of this Article. The fact is
that one-sidedness has always been a risk inherent in a free
press. It is a risk that our democracy has willingly accepted
because of the countervailing benefits of press liberty, and
there is no good reason why a different policy balance should
be struck for the broadcast press than for the printed press.
Nor is the obligation of the first prong of the Fairness Doctrine to cover local issues meaningless or trivial. Enforcement
of this obligation could go a long way toward achieving the
objectives of many congressmen and others who support the
Fairness Doctrine.
B. Political Broadcast Rules
The political broadcast rules, including the reasonable access
requirement for federal candidates,4 ' the lowest unit charge
law,42 and the equal time requirement,43 offer another arena
of controversy to which a theory of broadcast regulation based
on spectrum allocation objectives might be applied. For example, the principle of reasonable access for political candidates
40. Even under this analysis, the first prong of the Fairness Doctrine would be
merely permissible. The FCC would not be required to adopt it unless Congress
passed legislation to that effect.
41. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982).
42. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1982). For a limited time period before primaries and

elections, candidates are entitled to the lowest rate charged any other user for a
similar time slot. Id.
43. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).
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could be acceptable under first amendment analysis because it
is rooted in the localism objectives that underlie the allocation
of spectrum for local broadcast stations. However, the present
implementation of this principle, requiring broadcasters to accede to candidates' demands for broadcast time unless they are
unreasonable,4 4 goes far beyond a theory of regulation justified by this spectrum allocation objective. The broadcaster's
discretion should be unrestrained unless it is clearly inconsistent with the objective of providing a locally responsive service. Thus, the access principle for candidates should, like the
first prong of the Fairness Doctrine, be triggered only when
the broadcaster acts unreasonably, i.e., inconsistently with the
function of being locally responsive.
As to the lowest unit charge law and the equal time requirement, the nexus between localism policies and these rules
seems far-fetched. Even if the rules are justifiable as a general principle, they offend first amendment sensitivities because they are not narrowly drawn. Proponents of the
political broadcast rules could argue that unless broadcasters
give low rates to candidates, political discussion will be stifled
and stations will not be sufficiently responsive to their communities. Yet this reasoning seems too remote from the spectrum allocation objectives of localism to withstand the O'Brien
test, although it illustrates the sort of evaluation that should
be undertaken.4 5
C. Renewal Standards
Another recurring and knotty issue is the matter of the appropriate standards for broadcast renewal applicants, particularly in, but not limited to, comparative renewal proceedings
where the Supreme Court has required a hearing among competing applicants.46
Here, too, the tension between conflicting principles is readily apparent. On the one hand, the Supreme Court held in
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. that renewal applicants
44. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980), aff'd, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
45. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that various political broadcast rules
could be justified as a legitimate exercise of Congress' right to regulate elections-to
make sure that elections are fair and informative. If this is the proper rationale,
however, it would apply equally to the print media, yet broadcast-type political regulations are not extended to newspapers.
46. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945).
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must be judged by the standard of "public convenience, interest, or necessity.

'47

This holding requires the Commission to

evaluate which applicant, if licensed, would provide the best
practicable service to the community. 48 A licensee's past programming performance has often been pointed to as the best
predictor of the licensee's likely future service.49 Yet, on the
other hand, it would be obviously improper to prefer one applicant over another on the basis of the content of its programming, for example, whether it leaned to the Democratic or
Republican side of the aisle.
An approach based on allocation policy objectives may help
clarify this murky area. If broadcast frequencies are allocated
to serve localism objectives, then it seems legitimate to award
renewal expectancies to incumbent broadcasters who have
provided community-responsive service.5
Just as a Citizens
Band licensee who uses assigned frequency for unauthorized
hobby uses would jeopardize its license, so a broadcaster
would risk non-renewal for failure to provide programming
that serves the objectives of localism.
Because of first amendment considerations, however, the renewal standard should be content-neutral and not unduly intrusive. There may be other legitimate ways to strike the
appropriate balance, but surely one way would be to establish
a simple, reasonable quantitative standard applicable to a
broadly defined category of programming as a presumption
that a renewal applicant's service has satisfied localism objectives. 5 1 Perhaps one such category could be non-entertainment, non-sports programming (with possibly special
recognition for locally produced programs). An alternative
47. 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940).
48. Id. at 138 n.2.
49. See Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
("Of course the incumbent's past performance is some evidence, and perhaps the
best evidence, of what its future performance would be."), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S.
957 (1979).
50. This standard bears a close resemblance to the first prong of the Fairness
Doctrine as described above.
51. Even Senator Robert Packwood, who has led the congressional forces favoring "full first amendment rights" for broadcasters, expressed an interest in a proposal for a modest quantitative standard for evaluating television renewal applicants.
Broadcasting Improvements Act of 1987 Hearings on S. 1277 Before the Subcomm.
on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 123-25 (1987).
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category could be programming that is responsive to local issues and concerns.

V
A New Allocations Theory and Its Implications
for Broadcast Regulation
Over the past eight years, FCC Chairmen Mark Fowler and
Dennis Patrick have led a revolution in thinking about allocations policy that goes to the very heart of the allocation/interference theory developed above and threatens to cause the
dismantling of all (or most of) the current regulatory edifice. 2
Their theory is that communications policy should be directed
toward maximizing the services that the public desires and
that licensees, not the FCC, should be given the latitude to
determine the public's demands through the normal mechanisms of the marketplace. As such, they advocate a marketplace mechanism whereby applicants bid for the spectrum and
then put it to the highest use, as determined by profitability.
This use may change over time and vary from location to location. Proponents of this theory do not argue that present allocations policy (as opposed to content regulation) violates the
first amendment, but prefer their marketplace approach as a
more tailored, responsive, and effective tool for allocating the
53
spectrum among competing uses.
There are two principal limitations to a marketplace approach to spectrum allocation. First, it tends to give short
shrift to technical/interference considerations. For example, a
pure marketplace approach assumes, but does not define, certain interference protection standards that local courts, absent
the FCC, would have to enforce and that licensees could bargain away in private deals with each other. In fact, these technical considerations are enormously complex-changing as
technology changes-and even today the FCC is doing an increasingly inadequate job of adapting these policies to new
52. See, e.g., Deregulation of Commercial Television, 98 F.C.C.2d at 1114 ("Our
action today constitutes a significant step in the deregulation of commercial television. It is predicated on the recognition that marketplace dynamics, not our regulations, are the primary determinants of licensee performance with respect to
programming, commercialization and ascertainment."); see generally Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982).
53. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 52, at 209-12.
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technologies and of enforcing these policies.5 4 Moreover, the
prospect of thousands of different judges enforcing and inevitably shaping these policies clearly raises the specter of Babel
that all sought to avoid in 1927 and 1934.15 Such an approach
threatens to shrink the size of the pie, even if (as its proponents claim) the approach were capable of dividing the pie
more efficiently than the present system. This is because the
government's technical/interference policies enhance efficiency and do not merely resolve potential disputes among
competing users.
The second shortcoming of the marketplace approach to
spectrum allocation is that it overlooks the "public good" aspect of various spectrum uses. The "public good" is an economic concept for goods and services to which the
marketplace does not attribute an adequate value. 56 Common
examples of public goods include police and fire protection
and public education. "Public good" uses of the spectrum include emergency police and fire communications, and public
broadcasting. Commercial broadcasting also has "public good"
aspects, including the provision of universal, free and local service.
A pure marketplace approach to spectrum allocation
does not adequately accommodate these "public good" benefits, although perhaps it could be modified to take them into
account.5 8
54. This is due, in part, to the significant reduction in recent years of the staff at
the FCC, especially the technical staff. In 1979, the FCC employed approximately
2,232 full-time employees, with 142 in the Office of Engineering and Technology
(OET), which is responsible for dealing with new technologies, spectrum allocation,
and other technical subjects. FCC 45TH ANNUAL REPORT (fiscal year 1979). This
year, there are fewer than 1,760 staffers and less than 100 OET staff positions. Reagan Offers Final Budget Legacy, BROADCASTING, Jan. 16, 1989, at 96. The OET
figures were obtained from Chief Lawrence Petak of the OET Program Management Staff.
55. Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927); Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1982).
56. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 52, at 252.
57. For example, a 1986 Report published by the FCC placed the value of the
annual gross benefits of television to consumers in 1985 at over $81 billion, while
revenues alone would put only an $11.5 billion price tag on television broadcasting.
See THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND THE OFFICE OF PLANS

& POLICY, THE FCC AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 8-9 (1986). Perhaps the public
good attributes of broadcast service account for the nearly $70 billion differential.
58. Marketplace allocations theory also seems ill-suited to the need for longterm planning. The set-asides of spectrum for UHF television and public broadcasting, for instance, would have been inconsistent with a marketplace philosophy.
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Conclusion
For the time being at least, the marketplace approach to
spectrum allocation remains largely a proposal. The FCC has
not implemented it except on a very limited basis and Congress has generally opposed it. Until it is adopted much more
widely, government will continue to allocate spectrum among
competing uses on the basis of the perceived contributions
made to the public welfare by these uses. If broadcasters are
to retain their right to the spectrum both as a class and as
individual licensees, they must continue to provide locally
responsive service, which Congress has defined as the purpose
of their spectrum allocation. Government regulations properly confined to this policy objective appear to be constitutionally permissible. On the other hand, broadcast regulation that
goes beyond this purpose will continue to be suspect. In the
ongoing debate about broadcast regulation, allocation objectives continue to offer a worthwhile and perhaps necessary
touchstone.

